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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAYTON CITY, : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
Case No. 880653-CA 
ALEX LOPEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from the Defendant's convictions of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and Delaying and Obstructing an 
Officer. Those convictions were entered after a jury trial in 
which the Defendant was found guilty of these two charges and 
acquitted of a third. The trial was held in the Layton Department 
of the Second Circuit Court, Davis County, State of Utah. 
Pursuant to statute, Section 78-2a-3 (2)(d), Utah Code 
Annotated, this Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
appeals from the circuit courts. 
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and Delaying and Obstructing and Officer in 
the Layton Department of the Second Circuit Court, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court properly ruled in denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss which complained that Defendant's right to a 
speedy trial had been breached. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
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of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. 
• • • • 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section 76-1-302 (l)(b) 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, prosecutions 
for other offenses are subject to the following periods of 
limitation: 
• • • 
(b) a prosecution for a misdemeanor other than 
negligent homicide shall be commenced within two 
years after it is committed; 
• • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case involving the traffic offenses of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and Failure to Remain at 
the Scene of an Accident, and the offense of Delaying and 
Obstructing an Officer, all class B misdemeanors against Alex Lopez 
(hereinafter "Defendant"). 
The charges herein are the result of an incident that occurred 
on August 16, 1986 within Layton City. While police 
officers were investigating a citizen's complaint of a vehicle 
running over a mail box, they came across the Defendant and an 
6 
acquaintance. As they were speaking to the Defendant and the 
acquaintance, they were approached by the Defendant's wife, Barbara 
Lopez (hereinafter "Barbara")/ who was subsequently arrested for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") after 
she informed the investigating officers, in the presence of the 
Defendant, that she was the driver of the vehicle involved in the 
incident. A jury trial was held December 5, 1986 wherein Barbara, 
the defendant therein, and the Defendant herein testified that the 
Defendant, and not Barbara, was the driver. Barbara was acquitted. 
Thereafter, charges of DUI, Leaving the Scene of an Accident, 
and Delaying and Obstructing an Officer were filed against the 
Defendant on January 26, 1987. At the pre-trial on March 31, 1987 
the trial court granted the parties seven (7) days to attempt a 
resolution. No resolution was made or presented to the trial 
court. 
After having discovered that no trial setting was made, the 
trial court set a second pre-trial dated for January 13, 1988. 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 28, 1988. A 
hearing on the Defendant's motion was held on March 11, 1988 and 
the Defendant's motion was denied and a jury trial was set for 
April 11, 1988. 
A jury trial was held April 11, 1988 and at the conclusion 
thereof the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the DUI and 
Delaying and Obstructing charges and acquitted the Defendant of 
Leaving the Scene of an Accident. The trial court entered 
convictions on the charges of which the jury found the Defendant 
7 
guilty• 
Defendant makes this appeal, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on August 16, 1986 the Layton 
Police were notified that a vehicle had just run up over a curb 
and destroyed a mail box,, (Barbara Lopez Trial Transcript 
(hereinafter "B.L. Tr.") pp. 22, 23). 
The Defendant approached a neighbor asking for "a jump" to 
get the vehicle restarted, and stated that his "wife was driving." 
(B.L. Tr. pg. 16). The owner of the mailbox confronted the 
Defendant, and the Defendant, without providing any identification 
or other information, assured the owner that Defendant would "pay 
for that." (B.L. Tr. pg. 23), as the Defendant headed towards the 
vehicle. Since the vehicle could not be restarted, the Defendant, 
along with the other occupants of the vehicle, began pushing it 
down the road. (B.L. Tr. pg„ 23). 
As the police arrived, the Defendant and his companions 
scattered on foot, leaving the vehicle at the side of the roadway. 
(B.L. Tr. pg. 27). Officer Steven Brown stopped the Defendant and 
"Marty" Martinez, an apparent occupant of the vehicle, as they were 
leaving the area of the vehicle. (B.L. Tr. pp. 32, 36). Officer 
Brown immediately noticed that the Defendant and Martinez had been 
drinking and he then initiated an investigation for a possible 
Driving Under the Influence violation in addition to the Leaving 
the Scene of an Accident complaint. (B.L. Tr. pp. 35, 36). No 
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sooner did Officer Brown begin asking questions about the incident 
/hen Barbara Lopez, the Defendant's wife, emerged from the 
surrounding foliage and stated "Leave them alone, I was the 
driver." (B.L. Tr. pp. 37-39, 57). 
The Defendant and Martinez acquiesced in this assertion and 
Barbara Lopez continued her assertion that she was the driver, that 
she ran down the mailbox, etc. (B.L. Tr. pp. 38, 39). Officer 
Brown noticed that she too had been consuming alcohol and requested 
that Barbara Lopez perform field sobriety tests. (B.L. Tr. pg. 
39). At the conclusion of those tests she was placed under arrest 
for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. (B.L. Tr. pg. 49). 
All of this was done in the presence of the Defendant and Martinez 
with no objections being made. The Defendant watched as his wife 
was arrested, handcuffed, placed into a patrol vehicle and driven 
off to jail. (B.L.Tr. pp. 70-71). 
Barbara Lopez appeared through counsel and the Circuit Court 
set a Pre-trial for September 15, 1986. That was continued to 
September 23, 1986 and was then held. At that hearing the Circuit 
Court set a jury trial date for December 5, 1986. At that trial, 
Barbara Lopez and the Defendant testified that the Defendant was 
the actual driver. (B.L. Tr. pp. 53, 84). The jury acquitted 
Barbara Lopez. 
After evaluating the evidence, the City, on or about January 
23, 1987, filed charges against the Defendant for DUI, Leaving the 
Scene of an Accident, and Delaying and Obstructing an Officer. 
(Tr. Ct. Rec. pp. 4-7). On January 27, 1987 the Circuit Court set 
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February 9, 1987 as Defendant's arraignment. On that day the 
Defendant called the Circuit Court stating that the Defendant's 
counsel was to "call in an appearance." (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). 
Pursuant thereto the Circuit Court allowed a continuance to 
February 17, 1987. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). On February 27, 1987 the 
Circuit Court set a pre-trial in this case for March 31, 1987. At 
the pre-trial the Circuit Court allowed the parties seven (7) days 
within which to reach a resolution or otherwise the matter would 
be set for trial. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). No notice of any 
resolution was given to the Circuit Court. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). 
After it was discovered that no action had been taken, the 
Circuit Court, on December 30, 1987, set a pre-trial for January 
13, 1988. At that pre-trial, defendant informed the Court of his 
intent to request a dismissal because of the delay. Defendant was 
to file a Motion to Dismiss based on the speedy trial issue within 
ten (10) days, being January 23, 1988. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). The 
Motion was subsequently filed January 28, 1988 and was the first 
time the speedy trial issue was asserted. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). 
On February 25, 1988 the Circuit Court set a hearing on the 
Defendant's Motion to dismiss for March 11, 1988 and that hearing 
was held. (Tr. Ct. Rec. Pg. 1). Although not reflected in the 
docket, after hearing argument the Circuit Court denied Defendant's 
Motion. After so ruling, and in an effort to have this matter 
heard quickly, the trial court set a jury trial for April 11, 1988 
which required the resetting of another jury trial already set for 
that day. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). The Circuit Court then sent 
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written confirmation of the trial date on March 18, 1988 to 
Defendant, and, due to an apparent mailing error, to the City on 
March 29, 1988. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1), 
On April 11, 1988 a jury trial was held and the Defendant was 
convicted of DUI and Delaying and Obstructing an Officer, and was 
acquitted of Leaving the Scene of an Accident. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 
2). 
Thereafter Defendant has taken this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant claims a deprivation of his right to a speedy 
trial. However, the Defendant cannot satisfy the criteria 
established by this Court in reviewing such challenges, those being 
length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of the right, and 
whether prejudice resulted. 
The Defendant is the cause of a very substantial portion of 
the delays in this proceeding, effectuating a waiver of the right 
of which he claims deprivation. The Defendant never asserted the 
right to a speedy trial but merely filed a motion to dismiss based 
on the lack of a speedy trial. 
Further, the Defendant makes a naked allegation of prejudice 
based on fading memories. The unsubstantiated allegations are not 
sufficient to support Defendant's claims. There is no evidence of 
the delays being intentional or oppressive, nor is there any 
indication of an advantage gained by the prosecution for these 
delays. 
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Finally, all of the filings, hearings and trials were within 
the statue of limitation time period, the primacy protection for 
a defendant from having to defend against a stale criminal 
allegation. 
Defendant has failed to establish any basis upon which a 
speedy trial deprivation claim may be founded. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
A. Defendant cannot satisfy the requirements of 
establishing a deprivation of his right to a speedy trial 
under the Utah State of the federal constitution 
Defendant contends that the time period that lapsed between 
the August 16, 1986 incident and the April 11, 1988 trial denied 
his right to a speedy trial. In analyzing an allegation of a 
deprivation of one's right to a speedy trial, the United States 
Supreme Court established four (4) primary criteria. Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514; 33 L.Ed.2d 101; 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972). That 
four part test has subsequently been utilized and then adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026 (Utah 1982), State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982), 
State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979), and State v. Giles, 576 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1978). The Utah Court of Appeals now utilizes this 
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same test. State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1987). These 
four factors are: "(1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; 
(3) Defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) 
prejudice to Defendant from the delay." Miller, supra, at 442 
(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192). 
1. Length of Delay 
The incident resulting in the charges being filed occurred 
August 16, 1986 and the trial concerning those charges in which 
the Defendant was found guilty was held April 11, 1988, (Tr. Ct. 
Rec. pg. 2), not May 4, 1988 or May 19, 1988 as inconsistently 
alleged by Defendant in his brief. (App. brief, title page and 
pp. 3,5,6,8). Although this time period is five (5) days short of 
twenty (20) months, a significant portion is attributable to the 
Defendant. At the conclusion of the following analysis regarding 
the Reason for the Delay, this Court will realize that the only 
period defendant can complain of, while yet maintaining some 
responsibility therefor, is a nine (9) month period. Such a delay 
of nine (9) months, however, should not in and of itself "trigger" 
a review of the remaining criteria. Only if a time period is 
substantially inordinate is a review of the remaining criteria 
required. State v Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). 
2. Reason for the Delay 
Defendant first complains about the five (5) month period 
between the August 16, 1986 incident and the filing of the charges 
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on January 26, 1987. Defendant presents this as an unnecessary and 
unreasonable length of time. That is a misrepresentation. The 
facts are uncontroverted. The officers investigating the accident 
came upon the Defendant and a male acquaintance of the defendant. 
While assessing the occurrence of a Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol ("DUI") violation, the Defendant's wife, Barbara Lopez, 
confronted the officers and claimed to be the driver. (B.L. Tr. 
pp. 37-39, 57). She was given field sobriety tests and then 
arrested for DUI all in the presence of this Defendant. (B.L. Tr. 
pp. 38-39, 70). Not until the day of Barbara Lopez's trial, 
December 5, 1986, did the Defendant ever assert that he, this 
Defendant, was the driver. (B.L. Tr. pp. 53, 84). Had the 
Defendant not participated and acquiesced in the fraudulent 
representation that his wife was the driver, causing his wife to 
be tested, arrested, jailed and then tried, it would have been 
Defendant's case that would have been disposed of on December 5, 
1986. 
Clearly then, the first four (4) months of delay rest solely 
upon the Defendant. Further, Defendant's conduct that is contrary 
to his stated desire for a speedy trial constitutes a waiver of his 
right to a speedy trial. State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348, at 349 
(Utah 1985)(citing State v. Truiillo, 656 P.2d 403 (1982)). 
With regard to the month between Defendant's wife's trial and 
the filing of charges against Defendant, it has been a consistent 
position by the courts that the delay between the date of the crime 
and the date the charges are filed need not be considered in a 
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speedy trial violation claim. "The constitutional protection 
afforded one relative to a speedy trial has no application until 
after a prosecution is instituted. See Foley v. United States, 8 
Cir., 290 F.2d 562, Cert. Den. 368 U.S. 888, 82 S.Ct. 139, 7 
L.Ed.2d 88 (1961), holding that prosecution is not instituted until 
an indictment is returned or an information is filed." State v. 
Renzo, 443 P.2d 392 (Utah 1968). 
The reasoning the courts have utilized in stating the 
inapplicability of speedy trial rights to pre-arrest delays is that 
without having the charges filed there are none of the restraints 
on one's liberty nor the oppressive conditions hanging over one's 
head as compared with one who has been charged and is awaiting 
trial. State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 (Utah 1985). 
Based on the rulings in the Renzo and Smith cases, the entire 
five (5) month period before the filing of the charges against the 
defendant is inapplicable to the defendant's contention of a speedy 
trial right violation. 
After the charges were filed, the next hearing was the pre-
trial scheduled for March 31, 1987. At the pre-trial the trial 
court allowed the parties time within which to attempt a 
resolution and the trial court set the date of April 7, 1987, by 
which these negotiations needed to be completed. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 
1). Thereafter, the docket is absent of any contact by either 
party with the trial court. There is no action reflected in the 
Docket until December 30, 1987. 
This delay is not unlike the delay the Utah Supreme Court 
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addressed in State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). In Banks, 
the Defendant was arraigned in October 1981 and trial was set for 
February 1982. Defendant filed a suppression motion in February 
that was denied and the trial date was rescheduled to May 11, 1982. 
On the trial date the parties submitted the case to the judge on 
stipulated facts. Unfortunately the judge died before rendering 
a decision. The presiding judge of that district ordered the 
parties to prepare and file stipulations in order for the case to 
be assigned to another judge for disposition. Thereafter, the 
parties failed to file the required stipulations and the case laid 
dormant for an additional eighteen (18) months. Banks, supra, at 
1382. The Court therein ruled that this eighteen (18) month delay 
was substantial to the extent that it "triggered" the necessity of 
addressing the remaining criteria. Banks, supra, at 1385. 
In the case at bar the trial court gave the parties seven (7) 
days within which to propose a resolution or obtain a trial date. 
Neither party contacted the trial court and the case was idle for 
nine (9) months, from March 31, 1987 to December 30, 1987, less 
than half of the time elapsed in Banks. The City submits to this 
Court that this nine (9) month delay should not in and of itself 
trigger the review of the remaining criteria. 
The Court in Banks, further stated that since the fault for 
the delay "can be laid at the door of both the prosecutor and 
Banks," Banks could not take advantage of the error. The Court 
continued: 
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The prosecutor claimed to have sent the stipulation 
to defense counsel. Although the prosecutor may 
have failed to mail the document, Banks is not 
entitled to take advantage of that clerical error. 
His counsel was jointly responsible for preparing 
the stipulation. When the stipulation did not 
arrive, Banks's counsel should have taken steps to 
locate it, inasmuch as his counsel had as much 
obligation to provide that document to the court as 
did the prosecutor. Given his counsel's awareness 
of the need for a stipulation on the record, his 
failure to pursue the matter is difficult to 
understand. 
Banks, supra, at 1386. 
The City would urge upon this Court that a nine (9) month 
delay does not require the additional review, particularly when 
such a delay did not forestall the disposition of a case within 
the statute of limitations and/or wherein defendant must share 
responsibility for the delay. Banks, supra, at 1386. Just as 
Banks was disallowed from taking advantage of the procedural error 
therein, the Defendant herein must not be granted a dismissal when 
he was equally responsible for contacting the trial court, the 
failure of which resulted in the delay. 
In the alternative, if Defendant asserts culpability upon 
either the prosecution or the trial court, at most the delay may 
constitute mere negligence. Even if the allegation is made, this 
State's Supreme Court addressed such an issue and stated: 
"Assuming, arguendo, that Salt Lake County officials were negligent 
in Defendant's prosecution, neglect is 'a more neutral reason' for 
a delay which, in this case, does not justify relief." State v. 
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, citing Barker, supra, at 531. 
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The remaining time period, from December 30, 1987 until the 
trial date, is a time period that, other than the two (2) weeks 
required to set and then hear the January 13, 1988 pre-trial, is 
solely attributable to the Defendant. State V. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1986). At that pre-trial Defendant informed the trial 
court of his intention to move to dismiss this case based on lack 
of a speedy trial. Defendant was ordered to file said motion 
within ten (10) days but did not do so for fifteen (15) days. (Tr. 
Ct. Rec. pg. 1). After receiving Defendant's motion the trial 
court set a hearing and Defendant's motion was heard March 11, 1988 
and denied. At that hearing the trial court set Defendant's trial 
for April 11, 1988. In an effort to accommodate the Defendant, the 
trial court set this matter as soon as was possible, which required 
the resetting of a jury trial already set for April 11, 1988. The 
time required to receive, set, hear, and rule upon Defendant's 
motion is solely attributable to the Defendant. State v. Miller, 
747 P.2d 440, at 442 (Utah App. 1987); Banner, supra at 1330. 
3. Defendant's Assertion of the Right to Speedy Trial 
The third criteria to be considered in a claim of denial of 
a speedy trial is whether the Defendant asserted said right. 
Barker, supra. There is no dispute that the Defendant neither 
asserted that right nor requested a speedy trial. Defendant's 
failure to assert said right "makes it difficult for Defendant to 
prove that he was denied a speedy trial.11 Banks, supra at 1386. 
After discovering that this case was not set for trial, the 
trial court then set the January 13, 1988 pre-trial. It was not 
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antil that pre-trial that the "speedy trial" issue was raised and 
even at that it was not a request or demand for a speedy trial but 
was presented as a motion to dismiss based thereon. There is a 
distinction between asserting the speedy trial right and moving to 
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial as indicated in State v. Ossana, 
739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987). "At no time did Defendant assert his 
right to a speedy trial. Defendant did move to have the 
information dismissed for lack of a speedy trial...." Ossana, 
supra, at 631. 
It is clear that the Defendant has failed to assert this 
right. Even if his motion to dismiss was interpreted as being such 
an assertion, the remaining delays from that time until the April 
11, 1988 trial date, are solely upon the shoulders of the 
Defendant. And, if the motion to dismiss is taken as such an 
assertion the trial court responded and the trial was timely held. 
Banner, supra. 
4. Whether Defendant Was Prejudiced by the Delay 
The final criteria utilized in analyzing the issue at hand is 
whether the Defendant suffered any prejudice by the delay. The 
United States Supreme Court in Barker, supra., identified three 
interests to be protected and weighed in evaluating a claim of 
prejudice and that same scheme was adopted by this State's Supreme 
Court. Ossana, supra. Those "interests to be protected are: (1) 
preventing oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (2) minimizing 
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the 
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possibility that the defense would be impaired." Ossana, supra, 
at 631 (footnote omitted). 
Concerning the first interest, the Defendant has never been 
incarcerated for this offense. Secondly, "If anxiety and concern 
were really prejudicial, Defendant was free to demand an 
expeditious trial." Ossana, supra, at 632. Nor has Defendant 
alleged any anxiety or concern. 
The third interest, that of the impairment of the defense, is 
the only one Defendant asserts as a basis for prejudice, and that 
was done with a self serving affidavit filed nearly one month after 
the jury trial. (Trial record pp. 37-40). The only claim of 
prejudice in Defendant's affidavit is that of loss of memory by him 
and his possible three witnesses. This fading of memories would 
be the same burden the City would have as the City also used a lay 
witness in addition to two (2) police officers. Further, in the 
first trial, wherein Defendant's wife Barbara, was the defendant, 
Barbara, the Defendant herein and only one passenger testified. 
The Defendant had received copies of the officers' reports and had 
access to the recording and/or transcript of the prior trial. 
Finally, the claim of prejudice by fading memories is not 
substantiated or supported but merely alleged, which is not enough 
to warrant consideration by this Court. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1984). Nowhere in Defendant's brief are any examples 
set forth supporting Defendant's naked allegation of fading 
memories, thus "no pursuasive allegation of prejudice from the 
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delay on the ground that his defense was impaired," has been made. 
Banner, supra at 1330. 
B. Defendant cannot satisfy the alternative criteria 
utilized by the Utah Supreme Court in analyzing 
complaints of speedy trial right deprivations. 
The Supreme Court of this State has on occasion used other 
factors when addressing speedy trial right deprivation claims. 
The Court has stated that the purpose of the speedy trial 
provision, 
is to guard against any intentional delay which may be 
oppressive or persecutorial in nature. In order to avoid 
any such baneful effect the requirements of the law 
should be respected and complied with insofar as can be 
achieved within the practical operations of the courts. 
However, the court does not lose jurisdiction because of 
such a delay and, unless there is some intentional delay 
of an oppressive character, which results in prejudice 
to the defendant, the processes of justice should not be 
wholly defeated thereby. It is for this reason that this 
court has consistently held that the statutory time 
within which a trial shall be had is directory and not 
mandatory. 
State v. Archeletta, 577 P.2d 547, at 548 (Utah 1978). Clearly 
there is no such intentional occurrence in the matter before this 
Court. 
Another consideration is whether the prosecution obtained some 
"tactical advantage over the defendant because of the delay or 
prejudiced defendant by allowing the evidence to become 
prejudicially stale." Smith, supra, at 714. In addressing this 
same consideration the Court also stated "that the defendant made 
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no showing that the delay in bringing the charge against him was 
intentional or designed to produce an advantage for the 
prosecution." State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985). 
In Bailey the Court further acknowledged the fact that the 
case was brought within the "statutory period of limitation, U.C.A, 
1953, Section 76-1-302, and stated that that is the primary 
safeguard against prejudice resulting from having to defend against 
stale criminal charges." Bailey, supra, at 284, citing U.S. v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. at 332, 92 S. Ct. at 464. It is undisputed that 
the case at bar was initiated and concluded within the statutory 
period of limitations, being two (2) years. Section 76-1-302 
(l)(b) Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
CONCLUSION 
The only period of delay not solely attributable to the 
defendant is the nine (9) months from the March 31, 1987 pretrial 
to the December 30, 1987 setting of the subsequent pretrial. The 
City would submit that this is not a length of time that triggers 
the speedy trial review. Alternatively, if the delay is to be 
reviewed, it is clear that defendant must share the blame for even 
that period of time and then is solely responsible for the 
remaining delays that were caused by his confusing antics and 
subsequent motions. Further, the fact that defendant failed to 
assert his right to a speedy trial must weigh heavily against the 
defendant in considering his belated claim of a deprivation of that 
right. Finally, defendant's naked allegations of prejudice are not 
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conditions suffered by the prosecution. 
In conclusion the City requests this Court to adopt the 
conclusion of State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979): 
The facts of this case do not show an intentional 
delay of an oppressive character resulting in prejudice 
to the defendant. The defendant's right to a speedy 
trial was not abused, and the trial court was correct in 
refusing to dismiss the action. The right to a speedy 
trial is meant to be a shield against oppression, and not 
a sword to be used to decapitate the processes of 
justice. 
Hafen, supra, at 541 (emphasis added). 
The City respectfully requests that the defendant's conviction 
be affirmed, the stay of execution be lifted, and the City be 
awarded costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q day of April, 1990. 
JL. 
ttorney 
ton City 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent was mailed to Defendant's Attorney, Steven^C. 
Vanderlinden, 1133 North Main, Layton, Utah 84041 on this 
day of April, 1990. 
1V_ 
Attorney 
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